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Introduction
In the latter part of the 1990s, several of the major economies in
South East Asia underwent one of the worst economic crises in living
memory. It is thus not surprising that economic historians with an
interest in the region are re-examining the experience of the 1930s.
One crucial difference between the crisis of the late 1990s and that
of the early 1930s is that the latter was preceded, and in large meas-
ure caused, by problems in the world economy. When the industrial
world fell into a severe economic depression in the early 1930s, most
parts of Asia were affected, mainly through falling export receipts
which in turn affected colonial budgets. A second difference was that
most parts of South East Asia in the 1930s were still under colonial
rule, and had little autonomy in framing or implementing economic
policy. Only Thailand remained nominally independent, but even
there the inﬂuence of foreign, especially British, economic advisers
was considerable. Given the very different economic interests which
the colonial powers (Dutch, French, American and British) had in
their South East Asian colonies, and given the widely differing nature
of the economic links between colony and metropole, it was to be
expected that the impact of the 1930s slump, and the policy
1 Versions of this paper have been presented at the International Association of
Historians of Asia (IAHA) conference in Jakarta in 1998 and the European Associ-
ation of South East Asian Studies (EUROSEAS) conference in London in 2001. I
am grateful to conference participants, and also to Gregg Huff of the University of
Glasgow, for helpful comments. In addition I am grateful to Jean-Pascal Bassino of
Paul Valery University, Vauban, for making available to me his estimates of GDP




responses which it provoked, would vary. This indeed turned out to
be the case.
This paper has three purposes. The ﬁrst is to examine the impact
of the 1930s depression on output and living standards in four South
East Asian colonies: Burma, Indochina, the Netherlands Indies and
the Philippines, and to compare the impact on these colonies with
the Kingdom of Thailand. Second, the paper examines the policy
responses to the world crisis adopted by these ﬁve regimes, paying
particular attention to budgetary, trade and exchange rate policies.
Third, the paper asks what difference alternative policies would have
made to the impact of the world crisis on these economies and also
examines the longer term effects on economic policymaking after
1945.
The Impact of the 1930s Depression on Output and Living
Standards
The ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth century witnessed a rapid
growth and diversiﬁcation of exports from all parts of South East
Asia. These exports were predominantly agricultural although tin
and petroleum products were also important, especially in the
Netherlands Indies. In volume terms, exports and imports grew
rapidly from the early 1900s through to 1930 and although most
countries experienced some decline in the early part of the 1930s,
recovery took place quite quickly and export volumes were all higher
in the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, Burma, French Indochina
and Thailand in 1938 than they had been in 1925 (Table 1). Per
capita exports in nominal US dollars were at least as high every-
where in the region in 1934–38 as they had been in 1909–13 and
several countries (Thailand, the Philippines, Burma and Indo-China)
achieved signiﬁcant increases (Booth 2000: Table 14.1). By the
second part of the 1920s, the ratio of exports to GDP appears to
have been well over 20 per cent everywhere in South East Asia, and
indeed much higher in Burma and the Philippines. Although there
was some decline in this ratio in Vietnam and the Netherlands Indies
in the early 1930s, it increased again after 1935, although it did not
recover 1926 levels in either country (Table 2). Import volumes also
began to recover in most parts of the region after 1935, and with
the exception of Burma had surpassed 1925 levels by 1938 (Table
3).
FOUR COLONIES AND A KINGDOM 431
TABLE 1
Export Volume Indices (1925 = 100)
Year NEI Thailand Philippines FIC Burma
1925 100 100 100 100 100
1929 133 97 138 107 105
1930 128 88 129 88 83
1931 114 103 122 77 84
1932 118 117 125 87 115
1933 111 121 146 101 125
1934 106 145 170 115 145
1935 108 114 133 129 154
1936 112 131 152 142 134
1937 128 112 151 147 120
1938 118 131 165 137 120
1939 127 n.a. n.a. 163 130
Sources: NEI: Van Ark (1986); FIC: Service de la statistique ge´ne´rale (1947);
Thailand and the Philippines: Birnberg and Resnick (1975); Burma: export data
from National Planning Commission (1960), Statistical Appendix, deﬂated by unit
value index of exports given in Aye Hlaing (1964: 146).
TABLE 2
Trends in the Export/GDP Ratio 1901–1938 (percentage)
Year NEI Thailand Philippines Vietnam Burma
1901 12 n.a. 28 (1902) 19 30
1906 16 n.a. n.a. 16 42
1911 17 17 (1913) n.a. 18 41
1916 22 n.a. 32 (1918) 18 35
1921 16 n.a. n.a. 20 47
1926 26 22 (1929) n.a. 25 36
1931 16 n.a. n.a. 14 40
1936 17 n.a. n.a. 21 50
1938 17 25 34 22 48
Sources: NEI: export data from Korthals Altes (1991), Table 2B; nominal GDP data
given to the author by Pierre van der Eng; Thailand Sompop (1989: 251); Ingram
(1971: 333–5); Philippines: Hooley (1968); Vietnam: export data from Bassino and
Huang (2000), Table 1; nominal GDP data given to the author by Jean-Pascal
Bassino; Burma: Aye Hlaing (1964: 111).
These ﬁgures may suggest that all the colonial powers in South
East Asia were pursuing broadly similar ﬁscal policies, and foreign
trade and exchange rate policies over the ﬁrst four decades of the
century, and that in most cases these policies were successful in pro-
moting rapid export growth and in shielding the colonies from the
worst effects of the world crisis of the early 1930s. In fact this was
far from being the case. First, there were important differences in
different parts of the region in the magnitude of the contraction of
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TABLE 3
Import Volume Index (1925 = 100)
Year NEI Thailand Philippines FIC Burma
1925 100 100 100 100 100
1929 147 130 141 149 111
1930 130 115 123 130 102
1931 109 88 120 106 89
1932 91 92 110 91 88
1933 85 96 102 90 82
1934 79 107 113 104 94
1935 77 124 116 108 98
1936 78 130 132 113 104
1937 106 113 136 137 110
1938 106 136 157 139 93
1939 112 n.a. n.a. 162 121
Sources: NEI: Import data from Korthals Altes (1991), Table 3B. deﬂated by the
import volume index in Korthals Altes (1994), Appendix A; FIC: Service de la stat-
istique ge´ne´rale (1947); Thailand and the Philippines: Birnberg and Resnick
(1975); Burma: import data from National Planning Commission (1960) Statistical
Appendix, deﬂated by unit value index of imports given in Aye Hlaing (1964: 146).
export volume and in the pace of recovery. Second, there were quite
striking differences in contraction and subsequent expansion of
import volumes. Third, the evidence in Table 2 suggests that trends
in exports did not reﬂect the full impact of the world depression on
output in South East Asia. This can be seen from the data on real
growth of per capita national product between 1900 and 1940. Thai-
land, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies, South Vietnam and
Burma all experienced some increase in per capita national product
in the ﬁrst two decades of the century; and in Burma, South Vietnam
and Indonesia this growth was sustained until the late 1920s (Table
4). North Vietnam’s per capita GDP hardly grew between 1900 and
1913, but growth accelerated between 1913 and 1929. In Burma
per capita net national product was substantially higher in 1931/2
than it had been in 1926/7. But all countries except Thailand appear
to have experienced a decline in real output per capita for most of
the 1930s, although there is clear evidence of some recovery in both
Indonesia and South Vietnam in the second part of the decade. But
only in North Vietnam was per capita GDP higher in 1938 than in
any year since 1900.
In the case of Thailand, the apparent failure of the economic
turbulence of the 1930s to have much impact on per capita output
owed more to the structure of the economy than to economic
policy. In fact, as will be shown below, ﬁscal policy was more
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TABLE 4
Index of Growth of Real Per Capita GDP for Selected Years between 1900 and 1938
(1938 = 100)
Year Burma Indonesia Philippines Thailand Vietnam
North South
1900 70 89 82 76
1901 95 68 85 80
1902 66 72 85 89
1911 83 83 83 91
1913 90 102 81 99
1916 112 85 78 91
1918 86 107 80 90
1926 110 102 89 101
1928 109 105 90 97
1929 109 96 96 91
1931 122 101 84 79
1936 114 95 96 95
1938 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: Data for Burma refer to net domestic product.
Sources: Burma: Aye Hlaing (1965: 289); NEI: Van der Eng (1992); Thailand:
Sompop (1989: 251); Philippines: Hooley (1968); Vietnam: Bassino, unpublished
estimates quoted in Bassino (2001).
contractory in Thailand in the early part of the 1930s than in
any of the four colonies. Thus it can be argued that economic
policy probably aggravated the effects of the world crisis on the
domestic economy. Ingram (1971: 162) has suggested that the
lack of involvement of the majority of the population in Thailand
in the cash economy, together with low supply elasticities for
staples such as rice and the low level of development of the
non-agricultural economy all meant that most Thais were little
affected by the effects of the depression. Sompop (1989: 70)
argues that the entire period from 1910 to 1950 was characterized
by slow growth in the export economy, and there is little evidence
that the decade of the 1930s was especially bad. In fact, value
added in the agricultural sector grew quite rapidly between 1929
and 1938, and accounted for almost half of total growth in GDP
(Table 5).
In neighbouring Burma by contrast, the NDP estimates compiled
by Aye Hlaing (1965) indicate that there was a signiﬁcant decline
in per capita terms over the 1930s (Table 4). This seems unlikely
to be solely due to the export sector, as the export volume decline
was no more serious than in Thailand, and the recovery about as
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TABLE 5
Accounting for Output Change: The Role of the Agricultural and Non-agricultural Sectors
% of the Increase/Decrease in GDP by Sector
Indonesia Thailand Philippines Burma
1928–38 1929–38 1928–38 1931/2
1938/9
Agriculture 34 46 12 −123
Non-agriculture 66 54 88 23
Total 100 100 100 100
Annual average percentage growth in value added:
GDP 0.9 2.9 1.9 −1.4
Agriculture 0.9 3.0 0.5 −3.1
Sources: As for Table 4; note that the data for Burma refer to net domestic product.
rapid (Table 1). Aye Hlaing’s estimates suggest that all the decline
in domestic product over the 1930s was due to the agricultural
sector; value added in the non-agricultural sectors, including
mining, grew over the decade (Table 5). The key task is to explain
this decline, and relate it to ﬂuctuations in both domestic and
international demand.
In both the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines, there had
been a rapid increase in export volume in the latter part of the
1920s; in the case of the Netherlands Indies export volume had
not recovered its 1929 level by 1940 (Table 1). The Philippine
export economy proved more robust for reasons which will be
discussed below. But as Hooley (1968: 7–9) has shown, most of
the output growth in the Philippine economy after 1918 came
from the non-agricultural sectors; foodcrop agriculture in particu-
lar was characterized by falling yields and stagnating technologies.
Only 12% of total growth in value added between 1928 and
1939 came from the agricultural sector, and in per capita terms
agricultural value added declined. In the Netherlands Indies,
around one-third of the growth in value added which occurred
over the 1930s came from the agricultural sector, which was
considerably more than in the Philippines but less than in Thai-
land (Table 5).
The effect of the world crisis of the 1930s on living standards
in South East Asia has been much debated. Brown (1986: 996–
1000) uses data from two rural surveys carried out in Thailand
in 1930–31 and 1933–34 to argue that there was no clear evid-
ence of falling consumption. But given the output data assembled
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by Sompop (1989: 251) this is hardly surprising; if per capita
output rose slightly over the decade, we would not expect a sharp
decline in consumer expenditures.2 In other parts of South East
Asia the evidence is more contentious, although there is certainly
evidence of hardship in those regions where large numbers of
wage labourers lost their jobs (for example the sugar-growing
regions of Java) or where markets for cashcrop sales contracted
because of international commodity agreements. Huff (2001),
using an entitlements approach, has argued that in British Malaya,
those workers who relied largely on non-food agriculture and
mining for their incomes suffered considerable distress as commod-
ity prices fell. Many of these people had little or no land to fall
back on. In some cases they drifted into the urban informal sector
in Singapore, where they eked out a miserable living as traders
or coolies. Huff presents evidence that the living standards of the
poorer groups in Singapore, who did not have ﬁxed money
incomes, fell during the crisis. This was almost certainly true in
other cities in South East Asia, especially in regions such as
Java and Northern Vietnam where rural population pressures were
high.
By contrast, in land abundant areas where cultivators never
lacked the land to grow food, severe hardship was rare. Sompop
(2000: 193–4) argues that the smaller, subsistence oriented
farmers in Thailand were unaffected by the fall in rice prices,
because they sold only a very small part of their production and
were not reliant on imported necessities. Similarly Norlund (2000:
209) has argued that in Vietnam, small farmers and tenants who
kept their land were not adversely affected, and indeed may have
beneﬁted from lower rice prices. Norlund argues that it was the
more commercial, and more indebted farmers in the south who
were most severely hit by the crisis. Similarly Brown (1999: 154)
points out that it was the indebted farmers in the Irrawaddy delta
of Burma who felt the effects of the crisis the most; in many
cases they lost their land. In Java, millions of people were hurt
by the direct and indirect effects of the contraction of the sugar
industry. There is also evidence of growing income disparities,
especially where nominal wages did not fall as fast as prices. To
2 It should be noted that some senior Thai ofﬁcials did argue that the effect of
falling rice prices on rural incomes in some regions was severe; see for example the
report by Prince Burachat translated and published in Chatthip et al. (1981: 198–
222).
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the extent that some economic groups actually increased their
incomes while others experienced a decline, it is hazardous to use
trends in averages (such as average rice production per capita) to
make claims about trends in living standards.
Policy Responses: Budgetary Policies
By the 1920s, all the economies of South East Asia had developed
signiﬁcant export sectors, relative to national output (Table 2). This
export dependence had important budgetary implications. Taxes
levied on exports and imports accounted for around 30% of total
budgetary revenues in both Burma and Vietnam by the late 1920s;
although the ratio was lower elsewhere (at least in part because of
the importance of revenues from government monopolies), large
export and import companies accounted for a considerable part of
government revenues from corporate income taxes. Thus when
prices of key export staples began to fall, government revenues were
affected in several ways. Export tax revenues fell with falling world
prices, and as import volume contracted so did revenues from import
taxes. The decline in both the volume and value of exports and
imports also affected corporate proﬁts and thus revenues from
income taxes.
It might have been expected that the colonial governments in South
East Asia would all have pursued conservative budget policies after
1929, and cut expenditures as revenues fell. In fact in the Philippines,
Vietnam and the Netherlands Indies this did not happen. After 1930,
budgetary expenditures increased relative to revenues; in both Viet-
nam and the Netherlands Indies, expenditures exceeded revenues by
around 50% in 1932 (Table 6). Budget deﬁcits of this magnitude were
not viewed as sustainable and after 1933 they were reduced in both
colonies although in the Netherlands Indies, budgetary expenditures
exceeded revenues for the rest of the decade. After 1935, budget sur-
pluses were achieved in both Vietnam and the Philippines. In Burma,
government revenues exceeded expenditures by a wide margin and
this was only slightly reduced as the depression worsened. The reason
for these surpluses was that Burma was expected to make a signiﬁcant
contribution to the budget of British India. Needless to say, this ‘ﬁscal
drain’ attracted criticism from Burmese economists after independ-
ence (Aye Hlaing 1965: Chapter 3). It was brought to an end in the
FOUR COLONIES AND A KINGDOM 437
TABLE 6
Budgetary Expenditures and Trade Taxes as a Percentage of Budgetary Revenues, 1929–39
Year Burma Vietnama Netherlands Philippines Thailand
Indies
Budgetary expenditures as a percentage of budgetary revenues
1929 57.3 107.6 101.9 88.9 99.1
1930 58.9 110.3 119.2 106.5 103.8
1931 64.3 118.2 126.0 110.7 112.8
1932 59.7 154.6 148.3 106.7 92.6
1933 61.9 128.5 147.1 101.4 92.5
1934 56.2 112.2 135.3 89.9 84.9
1935 54.6 102.3 118.7 91.7 97.3
1936 n.a. 89.3 114.0 89.2 92.5
1937 92.1 76.4 107.7 50.0 114.7
1938 93.8 86.8 111.7 106.0 112.4
1939 90.0 82.9 119.4 96.6 124.5
Trade taxes as a percentage of total revenues
1927 33.5 30.0 12.6 24.1 17.9
1938 26.4 31.0 16.1 19.0 30.5
a Refers to central government revenues and expenditures only.
Sources: Burma: National Planning Commission (1960), Statistical Appendix;
Andrus (1948: Tables 37 and 38); Vietnam: Bassino (2000), Tables 1 and 2;
Netherlands Indies: Creutzberg (1976); Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statist-
ics (1941), Chapter XII; Thailand: Ingram (1971: 328–29, Table XV).
.
latter part of the decade when Burmawas formally separated from the
rest of India, although in the three ﬁscal years after April 1, 1937 the
Government of Burma was still running a budgetary surplus (Andrus
1948: Tables 37 and 38).
Ironically the economy which experienced the most severe ﬁscal
contraction in the early part of the 1930s was Thailand, which was
nominally independent (Table 6). In fact as several observers pointed
out, the Thai authorities had always prided themselves on their ﬁscal
conservatism (Ingram 1971: 196–202; Sompop 1989: 182–3;
Schwulst 1931: 48). The inﬂuence of British ﬁnancial advisers, com-
bined with the fear of the Thai elite that ﬁscal proﬂigacy would have
led to more overt foreign control of the economy, are the reasons
most often advanced for the Thai ﬁscal stance. The extreme ﬁscal
conservatism meant that the government was reluctant to borrow
even to ﬁnance capital works. The result was that by the early 1930s,
the share of the Thai budget being spent on public works was lower
than in any of the South East Asian colonies, while the share on
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TABLE 7
Budgetary Revenues and Expenditures per Capita, 1929, 1934 and 1938
Year Burma Vietnama Netherlands Philippines Thailand
Indies
Budgetary revenues (US dollars per capita)
1929 6.44 2.52 5.14 3.63 4.15
1934 6.19 2.27 3.56 2.73 3.16
1938 3.73 1.46 3.72 4.19 3.50
Budgetary expenditures (US dollars per capita)
1929 3.69 2.92 5.24 3.22 4.11
1934 3.48 2.49 4.82 2.45 2.68
1938 3.50 1.40 4.15 4.45 3.93
a Figures for Vietnam refer to both central and local government revenues and
expenditures.
Sources: Budget data: Burma: National Planning Commission (1960), Statistical
Appendix; Andrus (1948: Tables 37 and 38); Vietnam: Bassino (2000), Tables 1 to
3; Netherlands Indies: Creutzberg (1976); Philippines: Bureau of Census and Stat-
istics (1941), Chapter XII; Thailand: Ingram (1971: 328–29, Table XV).
Population data from Hooley (1968), Ingram (1971: 46), Banens (2000), Central
Bureau of Statistics (1947: 6); Andrus (1948: 23).
Exchange rates: van der Eng (1993); van Laanen (1980); Service de la statistique
ge´ne´rale (1947).
general administration was higher (Schwulst 1931).3 The conservat-
ive approach appears to have intensiﬁed after the military coup of
1932 which brought the absolute monarchy to an end. Between 1932
and 1936, budgetary expenditures were kept well below revenues,
which had begun to grow again in nominal terms after reaching a
trough in 1932 (Ingram 1971: 329). Only after 1936 did expendit-
ures overtake revenues, at least partly because of the growth of
spending on capital works.
By the end of the 1930s there was in fact considerable convergence
in both budgetary revenues per capita and budgetary expenditures
per capita among the ﬁve economies considered here (Table 7). The
extreme outlier was Vietnam where by 1938, budgetary expendit-
ures were only 35% of the average of the other four. The reasons for
this are not entirely obvious. Schwulst (1931: 42–4) drew attention
to the very low expenditures in 1930 in Vietnam compared to other
3 The exception was Burma which Schwulst did not consider. According to Aye
Hlaing (1965: Table 22), in the late 1920s, about one-third of budgetary expendit-
ures was devoted to social services such as health and education, and public works,
while two-thirds went to general administration. This can be contrasted with the
Philippines where, according to Schwulst, over half of all budgetary expenditures
went on health, education and public works.
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parts of South East Asia, and explained it in terms of low allocations
to social services.4 It is striking that the decline in both per capita
revenues and expenditures in Vietnam over the 1930s was much
more rapid than in any other part of South East Asia, which would
suggest that a failure of revenue policy, combined with pressures to
eliminate the large deﬁcits of the early part of the decade, led to
Vietnam’s anomalous position in 1938.
Policy Responses: Trade and Exchange Rate Policies
The Evolution of Trade and Exchange Rate Regimes in South East Asia. One
of the main considerations which governed ﬁscal policy everywhere
in the region over the 1930s was the need to maintain exchange
rates in terms of the metropolitan currency. In 1930, when the Indo-
china piastre was given an exact value in gold equal to ten times
that of the French franc, all the currencies in South East Asia were
brieﬂy on the gold standard.5 Over the early part of the 1930s, the
various South East Asian colonies followed their metropolitan mas-
ters in deciding to abandon, or stay with, the gold standard; the
British colonies left with sterling in September 1931, while the
Netherlands Indies stayed on gold with the Netherlands until 1936.
Thailand stayed on the gold standard for several months after ster-
ling was devalued while an intense policy debate raged about appro-
priate policy responses to the deepening world crisis (Batson 1984:
Chapter VII; see also Vichitvong 1978). Finally, in May 1932, the
Thai cabinet agreed to relink the baht to sterling at the rate which
prevailed before sterling went off gold, and this link was maintained
until 1942.6 The Philippines had been pegged to the US dollar since
the Philippine Gold Standard Act of 1903. The system broke down
in 1918, and in 1922 a separate Gold Standard Fund and Treasury
Certiﬁcate Fund was established. Thereafter, the overwhelming
4 It should be noted that the data in Table 7 include the provincial budgets for
Tonkin, Annan and Cochinchina as well as the central government budget. In this
sense the data for Vietnam may actually be overstated compared with the other
countries which refer to central government revenues and expenditures only.
5 See Bassino and Nakagawa (2000: 11–13) for a discussion of the debate sur-
rounding the decision to put the piastre on the gold standard.
6 The British ﬁnancial adviser, Hall-Patch, argued that Thailand should stay on
the gold standard while his inﬂuential predecessor, Sir Edward Cook (by then in
Cairo) advised that the baht should remain pegged to sterling (Batson 1984: 219).
Cook’s advice was eventually adopted.
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priority of successive Philippine administrations was to maintain the
peg to the US dollar, rather than to maintain a ﬁxed parity with
gold, and the peso went off the gold standard with the dollar in 1933.
Parity with the US dollar was maintained until 1941, although critics
argued that the cost was ‘excessive’ levels of reserves held in US
banks (Jenkins 1954: 112).
There were also considerable differences across South East Asia
in trade regimes and structures of protection. Acts passed by the US
congress in 1909 established free trade between the USA and the
Philippines, although some quantitative restrictions remained on
Philippine exports to the USA (Espino 1934: 8). These were largely
removed by the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913, which permitted all
Philippine products containing no more than 20% by value of foreign
materials to enter the USA duty free. Essentially the Underwood
Act remained in force until the mid-1930s when the Philippines was
granted self-government. Although there were critics of what was in
effect a Philippine–USA customs union in both the USA and the
Philippines, powerful lobbies in both countries beneﬁted from it and
developed a strong interest in maintaining it. By the end of the ﬁrst
world war almost two-thirds of Philippine imports originated from
the USA, and in 1929–33 the American share of Philippine imports
was four times its share of world exports (Table 8). An even higher
proportion of Philippine exports went to the USA. This reliance led
some Philippinos to argue for political independence on the grounds
that they must regain tariff autonomy in order to foster their own
industries, although agricultural interests, especially the sugar
growers, were far from enthusiastic about independence as they real-
ized they would lose preferential access to the American market.7
Until 1928 trade between metropolitan France and the French
colonies was governed by tariff laws which provided extensive protec-
tion for French products in colonial markets. Indeed, leading French
politicians made little secret of the fact that a key role of colonies
was to provide protected markets for French industries.8 But the
7 An extensive discussion of USA–Philippine trade is given in United States Tariff
Commission (1937); Espino (1934) discusses the arguments in favour of tariff auto-
nomy. Friend (1963) examines the complex negotiations over sugar quotas which
preceded independence, and Friend (1965: 116–21) analyses the economic interests
of the groups opposing independence. See also Corpuz (1997: 251–62) for a discus-
sion of the negotiations leading up to the formation of the transitional Common-
wealth government in November 1935.
8 See Marseille (1984: 50) who quotes Jules Ferry’s dictum that ‘la politique
coloniale est ﬁlle de la politique industrielle’. Meredith (1996: 34) has argued that
by the inter-war period, Britain too ‘valued its tropical colonies more as a market
than as a source of supply of primary produce’.
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TABLE 8
Metropolitan Shares of World Export Trade and Colonial Import Trade, 1929–33
Metropolitan Share Metropolitan Share Ratio
of Imports (%) of World Exports (%)
NEI 16.95 2.57 7.8
Philippines 63.81 13.75 4.6
Indochina 55.27 6.15 9.0
Burmaa 22.7 (45.4) 10.28 (3.25) 2.2
Thailandb 15.5 10.28 1.5
Japanese Share Japanese Share Ratio
of Imports (%) of World Exports (%)
NEI 14.34 2.86 5.0
Philippines 9.24 2.86 3.2
Indochina 2.76 2.86 1.0
Burma 9.3 2.86 3.3
Thailand 11.4 2.86 4.0
a Figures in parentheses are for the rest of British India.
b Metropolitan power is the United Kingdom.
Source: Thailand: Swan (1988: 76); FIC: Service de la statistique ge´ne´rale (1947);
Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics (1941); Netherlands Indies: Korthals
Altes (1991); Burma: National Planning Commission (1960), Statistical Appendix.
Data on metropolitan countries’ share of world exports from Clark (1936),
pp. 62–3.
tariff provisions were not reciprocal in that colonial products did not
automatically enjoy duty-free entry into France. This inequity gave
rise to great resentment in Indochina, and was ﬁnally removed in
1928 when a regime of reciprocal free trade was established within
the French Empire. As a result of this protectionism, Indochina con-
ducted very little of its trade with neighbouring countries, while the
share of metropolitan France in Indochina’s imports was nine times
France’s share of world exports in 1929–33 (Table 8).
The discriminatory trade regimes imposed by both the USA and
France on their South East Asian colonies can be contrasted with the
more liberal approach of the Dutch. Not only was there virtually no
tariff or non-tariff discrimination against imports from any source
after the reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, but there was also an
open capital account facilitating the inﬂow of capital and the repatri-
ation of proﬁts. Although both speciﬁc and ad valorem import taxes
were levied, both Dutch and foreign commentators emphasized that
tariffs were purely for revenue purposes, and the idea of protection
was totally foreign (Paulus 1909: 124; Fowler 1923: 399; Kuiten-
brouwer 1991: 67). But in spite of the apparently non-discriminatory
trade regime, the Netherlands continued to account for a much
greater share of imports into the Indies than its share of total world
ANNE BOOTH442
trade would have justiﬁed. Import enforcement ratios certainly fell
between 1880 and 1900 but by 1929–33, the Dutch share of imports
into the Netherlands Indies was still almost eight times its share
of world exports (Table 8). It is likely that various forms of subtle
discrimination against British and other importers persisted after
1870 through the dominance of Dutch trading houses in the export-
import sector, and of course through a Dutch commercial and legal
system which would have advantaged Dutch merchants.
The situation in Burma was complicated by the fact that Burma
was just a small part of Britain’s vast colonial possessions in the
Indian sub-continent, and until the latter part of the 1930s had no
autonomy in economic, or indeed other, matters. The constitutional
reforms of the early 1920s had accorded India considerable auto-
nomy in setting tariffs, and during the 1920s some tariff protection
was accorded Indian producers of iron and steel products and textiles
(National Planning Commission 1960: 84ff). But these tariffs had
no protective function in Burma which did not possess such indus-
tries; their only effect was to increase prices of imported textile and
steel products. After the Ottawa Agreement of 1932 India shifted to
a system of tariff preferences for products from other parts of the
British Empire, and over the next two years very high tariffs were
levied on imports from countries outside the imperial system, most
notably textile products from Japan (Chaudhuri 1983: 869). The
impact of these policies on Burma will be examined in more detail
in the next section. In the early 1930s almost 45% of Burmese
imports came from India and a further 22% from Britain (Table 8).
The very high reliance on imports from India did not change much
after the formal separation of Burma from India in 1937.9
Although Thailand was not a colony, the inﬂuence of British ﬁn-
ancial advisers in the Kingdom was considerable up to 1932, and it
was certainly the case that as late as 1929–33, the proportion of
total imports from Britain was rather higher than the British share
of world exports (Table 8). The Bowring Treaty, and similar treaties
signed with other powers in the latter part of the nineteenth century
had deprived Thailand of any capacity to use tariffs for protective
purposes, but by 1926 these treaties had been revoked and tariff
9 Andrus (1948: 187–92) discusses Burma–Indian trade after formal separation.
He takes issue with those writers who argued that Burma beneﬁted from having
the large Indian market for Burmese rice exports, and suggests that Burma would
have been able to dispose of its rice surplus on the world market without greatly
depressing world prices.
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autonomy substantially achieved (Ingram 1971: 147). But only very
limited use was made of tariffs as a means of fostering domestic
industry. As we will see below, Thailand’s liberal trade regime, com-
bined with the fact that the agricultural economy remained reason-
ably buoyant through the 1930s, led to a considerable growth in
imports from various sources, especially Japan. Indeed Japan had
become such an important exporter to most parts of the region by
the mid-1930s that it is often difﬁcult to disentangle trade policies
designed to respond to the world depression from those designed to
counter the perceived Japanese ‘threat’. I now look at both types of
policies in more detail.
Trade Policies in the 1930s: Responding to Growing World Protectionism
and the Japanese ‘Threat’. One of the most striking aspects of the devel-
opment of intra-Asian trade in the inter-war years was the growth
of Japanese exports. After 1920, Japan, as a ‘newly industrialising
nation’ embarked on the kind of export strategy which the erstwhile
Japanese colonies, South Korea and Taiwan, were to adopt in the
1960s, and many other Asian countries after 1980. Labour-intensive
industries such as textiles and garments, footwear and household
utensils which had been producing largely for the domestic market
began to penetrate export markets in other parts of Asia. Because
industrial labour was much cheaper in Japan than in the more
mature industrial economies of West Europe and North America,
Japanese products could be priced very competitively and they found
a ready market among millions of consumers who were more con-
cerned about price than quality. In 1920, over half of total Japanese
exports were going to Asia, and this percentage did not change
greatly until the latter part of the 1930s. A high proportion of the
Asian share of Japanese exports went to those parts of Asia which
were under the control of the British, Dutch and Americans (Table
9).
That it suited the interests of powerful lobbies in British Malaya,
the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines to have cheap Japanese
wage goods ﬂooding into these colonies in the early 1930s cannot be
doubted.10 Large estate companies were desperate to hold down
labour costs as prices for primary products slumped after 1930, and
world markets contracted. In the case of the Netherlands Indies, the
competitive position of key export industries such as rubber and
sugar was further damaged by the Dutch decision to stay on the gold
10 See Brown (1994) for a discussion of the response in British Malaya.
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TABLE 9
Japanese Exports to Selected Asian Countries, 1913–1942 (million yen)
Year Asiaa British Thailand Netherlands Philippines French
India India Indochina
1913 275.9 29.9 1.0 5.1 6.3 1.1
1920 998.4 192.2 4.2 107.2 34.4 3.4
1925 1000.6 173.4 7.8 85.6 29.3 4.0
1930 704.0 129.3 9.5 66.0 28.4 2.4
1931 505.5 110.4 4.7 63.5 20.4 1.7
1932 677.6 192.5 8.6 100.3 22.4 2.3
1933 930.6 205.2 18.1 157.5 24.1 3.7
1934 1169.5 238.2 28.0 158.5 36.5 2.7
1935 1304.4 275.6 40.3 143.0 48.1 4.0
1936 1370.9 259.1 43.0 129.5 51.8 4.7
1937 1645.9 299.4 49.4 200.1 60.3 4.6
1938 1664.7 188.0 39.3 188.0 32.6 3.1
1939 2320.3 211.0 26.0 137.8 24.7 2.0
1940 2493.9 233.5 49.3 173.4 26.7 2.6
1941 2155.1 163.2 65.6 161.0 13.4 45.4
1942 1748.7 0 66.5 15.7 1.3 144.4
a Excluding Japanese colonies but including China and Hong Kong.
Source: Japan Statistical Yearbook 1949, pp. 476–7.
standard after 1931. Because the Netherlands Indies was a more
open and less protected economy than the Philippines as well as
being a much larger market, it is not surprising that Japanese
exports into that market were much larger in absolute terms than
those to the Philippines. But they also comprised a greater share of
total imports, especially after 1930 (Table 10). Given the increasing
power of the militarist factions in the Japanese government, it was
inevitable that the Dutch colonial authorities began to worry about
the political and strategic motives behind the rapid growth of
Japanese exports. Certainly Japanese government agencies were
deeply involved in the export expansion into South East Asia, and the
huge Indonesian archipelago was, in the eyes of the Dutch colonial
establishment, especially vulnerable to Japanese ‘subversion by
trade’ (van Gelderen 1939: 21ff).
The ﬁrst years of the world slump were especially damaging to the
Netherlands Indies not just because of falling prices for key export
staples but also because of contracting markets. As both the British
and French empires retreated into greater protectionism, it became
increasingly difﬁcult to sell products such as sugar into either British
or French territory. Given that the metropolitan market in the
Netherlands for tropical products was small, and the Dutch pos-
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TABLE 10
Percentage of Total Imports from Japan
Year Thailand Philippines FIC NEI Burma
1923 n.a. 9.2 0.6 7.6 5.0
1924 n.a. 7.9 1.4 9.5 6.7
1925 n.a. 9.1 2.7 10.4 7.9
1926 n.a. 9.7 2.9 8.9 6.7
1927 n.a. 9.6 2.4 9.7 6.4
1928 2.8 9.6 2.1 9.1 6.5
1929 8.1 8.1 1.8 10.4 8.4
1930 11.2 10.5 1.1 10.9 8.9
1931 8.4 11.1 1.6 15.2 8.9
1932 14.4 7.8 1.1 19.1 11.6
1933 19.2 8.4 2.2 29.8 9.4
1934 25.3 12.4 2.2 31.9 9.3
1935 29.1 14.2 3.3 29.5 10.9
1936 28.3 13.1 3.1 26.2 10.6
1937 21.5 14.8 3.2 24.2 8.3
1938 15.6 9.6 3.1 14.5 6.6
1939 9.6 6.2 1.7 16.1 7.1
Source: Thailand: Swan (1988: 76); FIC: Service de la statistique ge´ne´rale (1947);
Philippines: Bureau of Census and Statistics (1941); Netherlands Indies: Korthals
Altes (1991); Burma: National Planning Commission (1960), Statistical Appendix.
sessed few other colonial territories, there was little option but to
cut back production. In 1929/30, when Java sugar production was at
its peak, it was more than three times that of the Philippines. By
1935/6, Javanese production had fallen to only about 20% of the
1929/30 level while that in the Philippines had surpassed Javanese
production by almost 50% (Booth 2000: Table 14.4).11
Given these problems in leading export industries, it was hardly
surprising that Dutch free-trade principles were tested beyond their
limits, and ‘the idea rapidly spread that the unlimited free trade
and open-door policy, which governed the whole foreign trade of the
Netherlands, including its inter-imperial relations, had to be recon-
sidered in the light of post-crisis conditions’ (van Gelderen 1939:
30). The new policies took two main forms. On the one hand trading
links between the metropolitan economy and the Indies were
strengthened by policies designed to reserve a large share of the
11 Most contemporary reports stressed the technical backwardness of the Philip-
pine sugar industry compared with the Javanese one. Corpuz (1997: 252) suggests
that one reason for this was that Philippine sugar cultivation was in the hands of a
large number of small and medium-scale producers, all of whom were Philippinos.
Unlike the situation in Java, growers devoted no resources to development of better
cultivation technologies.
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Dutch metropolitan market for colonial imports of sugar, corn and
vegetable oils. In the case of sugar the Netherlands guaranteed a
quota of 85,000 tons annually, in spite of protests from Dutch sugar
beet producers. Van Gelderen pointed out that these quota alloca-
tions were granted in part as a compensation for the implementation
of the second class of policies which involved imposing quotas on
imports into the Netherlands Indies for a range of imports. Some
goods were subject to general quotas, which enabled colonial
importers to purchase from the cheapest source (usually Japan) but
other goods were subject to speciﬁc country quotas. Typically cheap
cotton goods, and some household utensils were subject to general
quotas, while superior textile products, paper products, rubber tyres,
chemical manures, light bulbs etc were subject to country quotas.
The purpose of this system was to reserve a share of the colonial
market for Dutch, and to a lesser extent other European, producers.
It led to a marked downturn in the percentage share of Japanese
imports in total imports of the Indies from the peak reached in 1935,
although in absolute terms Japanese exports reached a peak in 1937,
and fell thereafter (Tables 7 and 8). In the Philippines, commercial
interests in the USA were also putting the colonial administration
under strong pressure to place tariffs or quantitative restrictions on
Japanese imports, especially of cotton textiles. Mindful of the
approach of self-government, and also concerned about the impact
of trade restrictions on prices of important consumer goods, the
Bureau of Insular Affairs, the main agency responsible for economic
policy, took a cautious approach to the imposition of import controls
in 1934–5. But US congressional pressure grew, and key senators
such as Millard Tydings began to suggest that if restrictions on
Japanese imports were not imposed, the USA would take a much
tougher approach to the granting of duty free access into the US
market for Philippine agricultural exports. Negotiations dragged on
through 1935 between the American and Japanese governments; the
upshot was that Japanese yarn and textile producers agreed to a
system of voluntary export restrictions to the Philippine market
(Guerrero 1994: 175–9).
Japanese exports to the Philippines were never especially large in
relation to total Japanese exports, and the Japanese government no
doubt reasoned that it was more prudent to appease the American
congress than to increase commercial penetration of the Philippine
market. After self-government was granted the absolute value of
Japanese exports fell, as did the share of Japan in total Philippine
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exports (Tables 7 and 8). In French Indochina by contrast, Japan
was never able to get more than a tiny share of the total import
market, and the absolute value of Japanese exports into Indochina
was minuscule. Indeed, the balance of trade between Japan and Indo-
china ran in favour of Indochina throughout the 1930s12 (Rahm
1952: Table XVII). What explains this failure? As I will argue below,
exchange rate policy is unlikely to have accounted for the persistent
trade surpluses as the piastre appreciated against the yen in real
terms for much of the decade. We must seek the explanation in
terms of trade policy.
Norlund (2000: 216) presents a useful analysis of the tangle of
vested interests, both in the colony and in metropolitan France,
which affected trade policy decisions in French Indochina as the
world crisis deepened:
agricultural interests in France wanted the French market to be protected
from colonial imports; French industrialists wanted protection for their
goods in the colonial market; colonial agricultural interests wanted the
abolition of restrictions on the import of their production into France and
opposed the protection of French goods in the colonial market. The Comite
de l’Indochine lobbied effectively for protection for Indochinese crops. Its
greatest achievement was to secure a free loan of 100 million francs in
1932 for French rubber plantations . . .
Faced with this barrage of contradictory demands, the French colo-
nial administration decided to restrict imports from other parts of
Asia, and especially from Japan and China. As far as the Japanese
were concerned, there is some evidence that they viewed the Indo-
china market in a rather different light from markets in other parts
of colonial Asia, such as British India or the Netherlands Indies.
No doubt French tariff policies accounted for much of the Japanese
hesitation. Touzet (1934: 151) quotes a former Japanese Consul-
general in Hanoi as stating in 1930 that ‘Japan has much to ask of
Indochina but nothing to offer her’. This was certainly not the
Japanese view regarding Dutch and British colonies. It appears that
the robust nature of the French response to any sign of interest in
the Indochina market on the part of Japanese exporters after 1930
served as a potent deterrent, or at least persuaded Japanese textile
exporters, to take one example, to target other parts of Asia where
colonial governments were more laissez faire in their trade regimes.
After the tariff changes of 1928–9, French textile interests lobbied
12 The main exports from Indochina into Japan were rice and coal.
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hard to prevent any imports into Indochina from Japan, and in 1932
(at least two years before either the Dutch or the Americans were
stirred into action), the Japanese and French governments signed a
trade accord which regulated trade between Japan and Indochina. A
list of products which the Japanese could export to Indochina with
an agreed reduction in the general tariff was drawn up; in Touzet’s
words the list was ‘sans doute un peu limite´’ but it was made clear to
the Japanese that that was all they were going to get.
Even a senior colonial ofﬁcial like Touzet was somewhat ambival-
ent about the impact of this aggressive protectionism; he acknow-
ledged that the level of trade between Indochina and Japan was
‘derisory’ and expressed the view that it could, and should expand.
But on the other hand he also pointed out that Japan engaged in
trade practices which were potentially dangerous to Indochina; these
included not only ‘currency dumping’ through the depreciation of
the yen, but also dumping of manufactures at prices made possible
by ‘salaries de´risoires, longues heures de travail’ (Touzet 1934: 156).
Touzet notes the export offensive which the Japanese mounted
against both British India and the Netherlands Indies and pointed
out that Indochina had been spared most probably because of the
relatively small size of her market. But the nature of French protec-
tionism was almost certainly the most important explanation, and
Japanese exports to Indochina were to expand rapidly after 1941,
when the disruption of trade links with France made it a far more
open and attractive market for Japanese manufactures.13
The robust nature of the French protectionist response in Indo-
china can be contrasted with the situation in Burma, where a form
of ‘double colonialism’ prevailed. Given that Burma in the early
1930s was simply a province of British India with no autonomy in
economic policy, trade policy was determined in New Delhi and
London. Japanese exports to British India as a whole almost trebled
in terms of nominal yen between 1931 and 1937, in spite of the
imposition of imperial preference in 1932 and high tariffs on
13 It seems that in Indochina large agricultural estates did not have the same
political inﬂuence that they had in the Netherlands Indies or in British Malaya, and
thus the pressures to allow in cheap wage goods were not as intense. Schweitzer
(1971: 238–9) suggests that the main aim of lobby groups acting on behalf of Indo-
chinese estates was to increase the tariff on foreign tea imports into France, and to
organize interest-free loans for the rubber plantations in Indochina, which, as Nor-
lund points out, was probably the main achievement of agricultural producer lobbies
within the colony.
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Japanese textile imports in 1933. Japanese imports into Burma
reached 11.6% of total imports in 1932, and although the percentage
declined slightly over the next two years, Japanese imports still com-
prised almost 11% of total exports in 1935/36, suggesting that the
effect of the protectionist measures adopted in 1932–33 was at best
transitory. There was of course no large-scale domestic textile indus-
try in Burma to protect from foreign competition, either from the
rest of India, Britain or Japan. The desire to keep the price of wage
goods cheap must have been an important factor weighing on the
minds of British administrators in Burma, and as Brown (2000)
argues, there is little evidence that textile imports declined on a per
capita basis after 1931.
In Thailand, where the government was not under the same pres-
sure from metropolitan vested interests in determining tariff pol-
icies, the share of Japan in total imports increased sharply after
1931, and by 1935 was as high as the Netherlands Indies (Table 8).
The Thai government which had come to power after the 1932 coup
against the absolute monarchy did not share the fears of the Dutch
or the British about Japanese intentions in South East Asia. The
decline in imports from Japan as a percentage of total Thai imports
after 1936/7 was mainly due to Chinese merchants boycotting
Japanese goods and replacing them with goods from other countries
(Swan 1988: 95–6). But the boycott eventually crumbled and after
the European war made it increasingly difﬁcult to obtain imports
from the UK and elsewhere, the Japanese share increased again.
Exchange Rate Policies. We have seen that, in relation to one
another, and to other important currencies such as the yen and
(except the Philippines) the dollar, nominal exchange rates in the
colonies followed the movements of the metropolitan currencies
over the 1930s. Relative to the dollar, the piastre ﬁrst appreciated,
along with the franc, and then depreciated after 1936 (Bassino
1998, Figure 1). This was also the path followed by the sterling-
based currencies, the baht and the rupee (Van der Eng 1993:
28). The Indonesian guilder underwent a sharp appreciation
against the dollar until 1936 when the Netherlands ﬁnally decided
to go off the gold standard. The yen by contrast left the gold
standard in December 1931, after the Japanese had lost 675
million yen in gold in a vain attempt to defeat speculators, and
thereafter depreciated rapidly against both the dollar and sterling,
and the other currencies pegged to them (Kindleberger 1987:
163–4). By 1935, the yen had lost more than half its value against
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the various South East Asian currencies; the nominal devaluation
was especially steep against the Indies guilder.
In the Netherlands Indies, there was a sharp deﬂation during
the years from 1929 to 1936; by 1936 the cost of living for low
income indigenous families in Batavia (Jakarta) was only half what
it had been in 1929 (Booth 2000, Table 4.5). But given the
magnitude of the nominal appreciation, the deﬂation was insufﬁ-
cient to restore the real value of the guilder against the yen
(Booth 1994: Table 6.8). In Indochina where the rate of deﬂation
was far more modest, the piastre appreciated sharply against the
yen between 1931 and 1935; indeed, the real exchange rate of
the piastre against the yen only returned to its 1931 value in
1937 (Booth 2000, Table 4.6). Given the extent of the appreci-
ation against the yen, why did Japanese imports not ﬂood into
Indochina? The answer lay in the ever more stringent controls
applied by the French against all imports originating from outside
the French Empire. As I have already argued, the French adminis-
tration faced a complicated set of demands from diverse vested
interests in both the colony and metropolitan France as the crisis
deepened. But ultimately, considerations of imperial preference
obviously weighed more heavily in the minds of the French than
those of consumer welfare in the colony.
The departure from gold certainly made Thai rice exports more
competitive, as Sompop (2000: 192) argues, although the price
advantage was offset in several key markets by the import controls
which many rice-importing countries in Asia and elsewhere
imposed after 1932. In addition Thai rice exports were of higher
quality than those from Vietnam and Burma, and consumers in
important markets such as neighbouring Malaya switched to less
expensive rice as their incomes fell. But in spite of these problems
Thai rice exports recovered in volume terms quite rapidly from
the low point reached in 1930, and the average annual tonnage
exported in 1936–38 was some 13 per cent higher than the
average for 1928–30. The Thai government was sensitive to the
problems of rural producers, and realized that exchange rate policy
alone was insufﬁcient to boost rural incomes. After 1932, both
the tax on rice ﬁelds and the poll tax were reduced, and many
agricultural debts were written off (Sompop 2000: 194–5).
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Would Alternative Policies Have Made a Difference?
This comparative study of the responses of four colonial regimes,
and one nominally independent one, in South East Asia to the world
crisis of the 1930s has tried to clarify and explain the differences in
these responses. In the case of the colonies, administrators in British
Burma, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies and French Indo-
china had to deal with a range of often contradictory demands from
powerful vested interests both in the colony and in the metropolitan
power. In addition all were concerned, to a greater or lesser extent,
with the economic and strategic threat posed by Japan. It is true
that colonial administrators everywhere in South East Asia were also
concerned about the welfare of the indigenous population, and
wanted to protect them, to the greatest extent possible, from the
effects of the worldwide economic blizzard raging around them. But
they were often constrained in what they could do by powerful eco-
nomic interests both in the colony and at home.
But even if they had not faced these constraints, would alternative
policies have made a difference, both to economic growth and to
popular welfare? In this section, I try to answer this question for
each of the ﬁve economies in turn.
French Indochina. There can be little doubt that the French author-
ities in Indochina adopted the most robustly protectionist policies,
especially with respect to Japan. Defenders of the trade and
exchange rate policies adopted over the 1930s argued that total
export volume from Indochina rose quite rapidy after 1930, and cer-
tainly more rapidly than in the Netherlands Indies, the other colony
which stayed with its metropolitan counterpart on the gold exchange
standard until 1936 (Table 1). Touzet (1939: 244ff) pointed out
that rice exports after falling from 1.47 million tonnes in 1929 to
only 960,000 tonnes in 1931, rose steeply to almost 1.8 million
tonnes by 1936.14 The increase in exports was almost entirely due to
expanded exports to metropolitan France and the French colonies;
of the non-French markets for Indochinese rice which had been
important prior to 1930, only British India was importing an
increased quantity by 1937. Touzet made much of the fact that Indo-
china could still manage to export rice to India in spite of the depre-
ciation of the rupee relative to the piastre. He argued, no doubt
14 Exports of manufactured goods also increased between 1935 and 1938, espe-
cially cement and cotton fabrics. See Mitchell (1942), Table 44.
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correctly, that it was not exchange rate policy per se but rather the
change in French agricultural protectionism which permitted the
rapid expansion of rice exports from Indochina into France and the
French Empire, and pointed out that (as with the case of Philippine
sugar exports to the USA), having a protected metropolitan market
to sell into proved a great boon to colonial agricultural exporters
during a period of contracting world markets.
On the other hand, the policy of protectionism did lead to higher
costs in French Indochina compared to neighbouring countries. Nor-
lund (2000: 218) quotes the estimate of Pierre Bernard that prices
in Indochina were 15% above those in other parts of Asia. The com-
plaints of the rubber estates that the high cost of wage goods was
reducing their competitiveness in world markets were met with sub-
stantial interest-free loans, and rubber exports grew by more than
six-fold between 1930 and 1939 (Takada 2000: Table 9). But other
sectors with less political inﬂuence were not assisted. The evidence
that real wages did not decline between 1930 and 1936 could be
used as evidence that the franc–piastre peg did not harm the welfare
of wage and salary workers (Giacometti 2000: 192). But the vast
majority of the population in Vietnam were not working for wages
in the urban economies of Hanoi and Saigon. They suffered from
higher prices than would have prevailed with a more open trade
regime, and from reduced employment opportunities.
The key issue concerns the exchange rate. What if the piastre had
been left to ﬂoat in 1930? A ﬂoating rate combined with controls
over the capital account of the balance of payments would obviously
have given the colonial government greater power to pursue anti-
cyclical ﬁscal and monetary policies. Arguably such policies could
have led to more rapid economic diversiﬁcation, especially in the
north where the population pressure on land was already intense.
Given that budgetary expenditures were smaller in per capita terms
in Vietnam compared with other parts of South East Asia, an
increase in expenditures on both capital works and health and educa-
tion would have contributed to increased productivity and improved
living standards over the decade.
Norlund (1991: 88–9) has argued that French tariff policies did
not completely prevent industrialization for the domestic market in
Indochina, any more than American tariff policies did in the Philip-
pines. Indeed, by the 1920s, Indochina had achieved a considerable
level of industrialization, and there was a thriving handicraft sector
(Shepherd 1941: 9ff; Mitchell 1942: 153ff). A different trade and
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exchange rate regime in the 1930s could have built on this founda-
tion, leading to a more diversiﬁed export sector with manufactured
goods accounting for a higher proportion of total exports. In the
event such export diversiﬁcation had to wait until the mid-1980s,
when the communist regime adopted a ﬂoating exchange rate, and
a trade regime more conducive to export growth.
Philippines. To an even greater extent than was the case in French
Indochina, the agricultural economy of the Philippines beneﬁted
from access to the protected American market. But the beneﬁts
clearly accrued disproportionately to the sugar producers, the largest
of whom exercised considerable inﬂuence over economic policymak-
ing, both before and after 1935. Their inﬂuence was exclusively
brought to bear on the issue of the sugar quota in the USA; the
broader issue of the peso–dollar parity rate seems to have been of
less concern (Corpuz 1997: 254–5). But as Hooley (1996: 296)
argues, there is evidence that the rate of two pesos to the dollar
represented an overvaluation of the peso even in 1904; after 1920
when the terms of trade of the Philippines began to decline, the
consequences of the over-valuation were increasingly serious for all
traded goods producers. The sugar producers, by negotiating quotas
in the American market, in effect secured a subsidy for their exports,
whereas an across the board devaluation would have assisted all pro-
ducers of exports and import substitutes. Hooley (1996: 297) wryly
points out that the irony of this policy was that the American govern-
ment, then as now ideologically committed to a free market philo-
sophy, ‘would end up erecting a trade regime in the Philippines
which was a monument to interventionism’. This legacy carried over
into the post-1945 era, and indeed survived until the 1980s.
Netherlands Indies. If important export sectors such as rice in French
Indochina and sugar in the Philippines beneﬁted from protected
markets either in the metropolitan economy or in other parts of the
imperial trading system, key export industries in the Netherlands
Indies beneﬁted to only a very limited extent from this form of pro-
tection. The most obvious example was the sugar industry whose
contraction after 1930 was entirely due to loss of markets especially
in the British Empire. Colonial ofﬁcials might have been expected
to respond to this disaster with a devaluation of the Indies guilder
which would at least have allowed sugar producers to compete more
aggressively in the markets which were still open to them. But the
Netherlands government was determined to keep both currencies on
the gold standard, so that domestic deﬂation, and direct controls,
ANNE BOOTH454
were the only policy tools left to assist the traded goods sectors. As
we have seen, the deﬂation, although severe, was not enough to bring
about a real depreciation of the guilder against other regional and
world currencies. The appreciation was especially sharp against the
yen.
The inevitable result was that the colonial authorities resorted
increasingly to extensive regulation of both exports and imports after
1934; to quote van Gelderen (1939: 41), ‘government regulation . . .
proved to be the only way out’. In 1934, Japan supplied over 30% of
total imports into the Indies by value (compared with only 13% from
the Netherlands). The ratio fell after restrictions were applied. The
latter part of the 1930s saw the imposition of an extensive regime
of import licensing (Booth 1998: 218–22). The net effect of this
regime was not so much to slow down growth in imports (which was
in fact quite rapid as the economy began to recover after 1935), but
rather to protect imports from the Netherlands and other favoured
countries against competition from Japan. Even so, the Indies
market remained by far the largest in South East Asia for Japanese
exporters right up until 1941 (Table 9). But the much vaunted com-
mitment to free trade principles had been severely eroded, and it
was a regulated rather than a laissez faire trade regime which was
bequeathed to the post-independence government.
Burma. A comparison of the available national income estimates
shows that Burma suffered most severely from the impact of the
world crisis. Per capita net domestic product was still almost 20%
below the 1931 ﬁgure by 1938 (Table 4). This was rather surprising,
in that although the volume of rice exported fell after 1934–35, the
extent of the decline (about 7.2%) was no where near severe enough
to explain the sharp contraction in agricultural output which Aye
Hlaing found between 1931/2 and 1938/9 (Table 5). Indeed, the
ratio of exports to net domestic product increased after 1931 (Table
2). As in Indochina, the impact of the nominal appreciation of the
rupee against the yen on imports from Japan was dampened by the
imposition of tariffs on Japanese imports. The absence of domestic
price indices in either Burma or Thailand make it difﬁcult to assess
the extent of the real appreciation of the rupee and the baht against
the yen, but it was probaby not very different from that which
occurred in Indochina. So without protection it is likely that Burmese
consumers would have beneﬁted from cheaper wage goods, especially
textiles. There was indeed justice in the Burmese complaint that
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the Burmese consumer was being taxed to protect a textile industry
located in other parts of India.
Two tentative explanations can be advanced to explain the severe
fall in national income per capita over the decade. By the 1930s
Burma was no longer a land-abundant economy in the sense that
Thailand still was, or indeed the outer islands of Indonesia, or south-
ern Vietnam and Laos. Thus the scope for agricultural expansion
and diversiﬁcation was limited. And as Brown (1999) has argued,
the problem was compounded by the extent and the severity of rural
indebtedness. A second explanation, and in my view the more
important, concerns the status of Burma as a province of British
India. One adverse consequence of this was the large imbalance
between revenue collections (which were a much higher proportion
of domestic product in Burma than in British India or in any other
part of South East Asia) and government expenditures in Burma. In
addition, Burma’s status as a province of India was detrimental to
the industrialization in the 1930s. Unike Vietnam, the Philippines
or the Netherlands Indies, the colonial government made no attempt
to foster industrial diversiﬁcation in the wake of the world crisis.
There was some opportunity to do so after the formal separation
from India, but there is little evidence that the opportunity was
taken. Burma remained an overwhelmingly agricultural economy;
not just were manufactures imported from India and elsewhere but
most services were in effect supplied from other parts of British
India. That this had a damaging effect on the post-colonial develop-
ment of independent Burma seems undeniable.
Thailand. Alone among the ﬁve economies being considered here,
Thailand was not a colony and the Thai government did have some
autonomy in policy formulation. There is little evidence that this
autonomy made much difference to macroeconomic policy over the
decade. Until 1935, ﬁscal policy was indeed more conservative than
in the Netherlands Indies, or Indochina, and a rigid peg to sterling
was maintained from 1932 until 1941 (Ingram 1971: 337). Thailand
lacked any protected imperial market into which its rice or other
exports could be sold, and this certainly affected its rice sales,
although total export volume held up quite well over the 1930s. The
Thai government did take steps to reduce rural tax burdens, and
also increased expenditures on capital works in the latter part of
the decade. But on balance Thailand, as Ingram argued, probably
‘weathered the storm’ better than its South East Asian neighbours
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not because of any overt government interventions, but because of
its relative land abundance, and the subsistence orientation of most
agricultural producers. There were few large agricultual enterprises
run along capitalist lines which suffered from the collapse of both
prices and markets, as did Javanese sugar producers, for example.
Neither did large numbers of Thais depend on wage labour for most
of their income as was the case in Java and Northern Vietnam, or
indeed in Peninsular Malaya and Singapore. Most Thai rice farmers
did not have large debts which they could no longer service from
falling incomes, as was the case in Burma. And the Thai government,
less concerned about Japanese import penetration, was prepared to
allow cheap imports to ﬂow in. The 1930s were thus a less traumatic
decade for Thailand than for other parts of the region, and the
impact of the world crisis on subsequent policymaking was less
obvious.
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